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Does the Quine/Duhem Thesis Prevent us from Defining Analyticity? 
 
On a Fallacy in Quine* 
 
Prof. Dr. Olaf L. Müller (Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin) 
 
 
 
I. 
There is no way to make good sense of synonymy and analyticity! Such was the 
slogan against the 'first dogma of empiricism', a slogan that shook and shocked the 
philosophical community more than four decades ago. Quine was the leader in this 
historic battle that nowadays is studied in the classroom.1 Quine's semantic 
skepticism sounds familiar to today's philosophy students. But having read the first 
locus classicus, 'Two Dogmas of Empiricism,'2 they are still wondering: Good and 
well, Quine has shown that some attempts to define synonymy or analyticity don't 
work; but how does it follow that there cannot be any satisfactory definitions for these 
notions at all? 
 
Pointing to this nonsequitur alone, however, doesn't suffice to rebuff Quine's 
challenge; as long as nobody successfully produces a positive account of synonymy 
and analyticity, it can hardly be claimed that Quine's skepticism has been proven to 
be wrong. So today's students summarize the war's first battle and write in their note-
books: So far, it's one to one. 
 
Then they turn to the second locus classicus, chapter II of Word and Object3 
[henceforth WO], in order to gain initiation into the mysteries of inscrutability, 
underdetermination, and indeterminacy. But the de-mystification is ready to hand: 
Blame all of it on Quine's behaviorism. The trick is to simply reverse Quine's 
arguments: He has shown, it is argued, that (i) on a behavioristic basis there is indeed 
no hope of reaching an understanding of our semantic notions; but (ii) we do 
  
 
2 
understand the semantic notions; therefore, (iii) behaviorism has been repudiated as a 
sufficient basis for semantics.4 
 
This move is premature for two reasons. First, it ignores the serious arguments Quine 
has to offer for his behaviorism in semantics. If we wish to explain semantic notions 
without question-begging we have to make these notions work for languages which 
we don't yet understand. Unless the famous linguist in the jungle is a mind-reader, she 
has access to no evidence other than the speakers' overt dispositions to verbal 
behavior. But I don't wish to pursue this issue further, since it has been discussed at 
length in the literature. 
 
What will concern us is the second reason why it is premature to reverse Quine in the 
way I've depicted above: Using Quine's own argument as a reductio ad absurdum of 
behaviorism depends obviously upon the assumption that Quine's main thesis (i) 
('Behaviorism implies semantic skepticism') is correct. But it is not, as I'm going to 
show. My claim is as follows: Even if we grant Quine his behavioristic purism we 
can still define analyticity and synonymy; the first 'dogma of empiricism' is no 
dogma, it is true. And, what is worse for Quine, his mistake lies not in a failure to 
anticipate some new sort of definitions; rather it lies in his repudiation of a definition 
that shows up in the legendary chapter II itself. His repudiation, I claim, contains a 
serious fallacy. 
 
In order to pinpoint the fallacy we'll have to revive good old Quinean stimulus 
semantics (section II).5 But before doing so I should indicate which Quinean 
doctrines will not be under attack here. First of all, I won't challenge the 
Quine/Duhem thesis of scientific holism because I believe that holism is true. Unlike 
Quine I hold that holism goes nicely with a clear notion of synonymy; ironically it is 
Quine who fails to appreciate how holism indeed supports the notion (section III). I 
also want to show that holism is compatible with a notion of the analytic (sections 
IV/V). 
 
Secondly, I am not going to discuss Quine's objections against the epistemic role 
some positivists wished to assign to analyticity. Rather, I shall be concerned with the 
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intelligibility of analyticity and synonymy, which is the more basic issue.6 The 
semantic notions might have a clear sense without being epistemically important for, 
say, physics. They could still be very useful for linguistics, viz., for describing 
languages, and even for describing the language of physics. 
 
The third Quinean doctrine which will not be attacked here is his inscrutability of 
reference. So I won't provide any argument to the effect that the jungle word 'gavagai' 
has to be translated as 'rabbit', as opposed to 'undetached rabbit part' or 'rabbit stage'. 
Quine is right, I think, that the linguist has lots of options to choose from when it 
comes to the translation of single words (as opposed to whole sentences). But since 
these subtle variations never affect what's happening on the level of complete 
sentences, I don't take the inscrutability of reference too seriously. After all, it is 
sentences we are interested in: I want to investigate under which conditions we may 
call a sentence analytic and under which conditions we may call two sentences 
synonymous. 
 
Finally, Quine's indeterminacy of translation will not be at issue. If this 
indeterminacy is to be taken as an indeterminacy of translation manuals, it follows 
directly from the inscrutability of reference, since translation manuals proceed word 
by word. But in this paper I also don't want to deal with Quine's indeterminacy of 
translation in its stronger version, which asserts that one and the same jungle sentence 
could be equally well translated by incompatible English sentences. I won't touch this 
strong thesis because I don't wish to define an interlinguistic notion of synonymy but 
only an intralinguistic notion, working for sentences of one and the same language. 
This, I claim, will suffice to defend what Quine calls the 'first dogma of empiricism'. 
 
It may be asked: Does this last restriction mean that I'm not willing to face Quine's 
challenge of radical translation at all? Yes and no. No, since the notion of synonymy I 
want to plead for applies to languages we don't yet understand: the linguist who is 
trying to find out which pairs of jungle sentences mean the same is indeed in a 
radical position. But, of course, she isn't translating yet. I hope that she will finally 
be able to exploit intralinguistic synonymies for her translation project, which is more 
global. How this has to be done will not be under discussion here. The only thing I 
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want to show in this paper is that we can make good sense of analyticity and 
(intralinguistic) synonymy even if these notions are to be applied to object languages 
that are not contained in the metalanguage. 
 
II. 
So let's find an unsuspecting subject from the remotest archipelago and investigate his 
speech dispositions by presenting stimuli to his sense organs. Given a sentence of the 
informant's language (say, 'Gavagai'), we can subdivide all possible stimuli into 
different classes. A first class, called the affirmative stimulus meaning of the 
sentence, contains all stimuli that would – if presented – prompt7 the informant's 
assent to the sentence (WO, p. 32). As is well known, in the affirmative stimulus 
meaning of the sentence 'Gavagai' are collected all rabbit-like stimuli. 
 
A second class of stimuli, the negative stimulus meaning, is defined analogously 
(replace 'assent' by 'dissent') and contains – in the case of 'Gavagai' – all stimuli 
differing evidently enough from those stimulations usually caused by rabbits (WO, p. 
32). 
 
When we know both affirmative and negative stimulus meaning of the native's 
sentences, we have accumulated all the information about his dispositions which 
Quine is willing to grant us – in the name of behaviorism. Does such knowledge 
suffice to distinguish every pair of non-synonymous sentences? Quine denies that it 
suffices; I want to show that he is wrong – provided that we really exploit the totality 
of that knowledge. 
 
To be sure, a readily available definition first considered by Quine is unsatisfactory. 
That is, to define two sentences stimulus-synonymous when and only when they have 
the same affirmative and negative stimulus meaning (WO, p. 46), is merely an 
unsatisfactory ersatz (WO, p. 66). Why doesn't such defined stimulus synonymy 
work? – Sometimes, it works well. Let's take a look at this case first. According to the 
definition, the informant's sentence 'Gavagai' is stimulus-synonymous to our English 
sentence 'Lo, a rabbit' (WO, p. 33). A reasonable result, isn't it? 
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We run into trouble, however, as soon as we test sentences our informant can deny or 
accept without being prompted to react so by current stimulation. At tea time, for 
example, my verdict on the sentence 'The morning paper has come' need not depend 
on present stimuli because I might remember some matinal stimulations. Stimuli 
containing the morning paper may prompt my assent to the sentence at tea time, of 
course, but I might assent as well even if the L.A. Times is completely out of sight. In 
this case, all the nice tea time stimuli don't say anything about the sentence under 
investigation. They don't contribute causally to my verdict on it. Hence, they don't 
belong to its affirmative stimulus meaning. Nor do they belong to its negative 
stimulus meaning (for my reaction is still affirmative, whether it is prompted or not). 
 
Such stimuli not contributing causally to a speaker's verdict on a given sentence (and 
hence belonging neither to its affirmative nor to its negative stimulus meaning) shall 
be labeled as irrelevant to that sentence from now on (WO, pp. 30, 36). These 
irrelevant stimuli are guilty of all calamities stimulus synonymy has to face. The 
more stimuli are irrelevant to a sentence, the sparser are its affirmative and negative 
stimulus meaning, and thus, the less information can be provided for tests of 
synonymy (WO, p. 63). 
 
Let's now push matters to extremes. Imagine a sentence to which all stimuli are 
irrelevant. Such a sentence I shall call stimulus-meaningless, for the following reason. 
The sentence's affirmative and negative stimulus meanings are empty sets; they don't 
embrace any stimulus because stimulus meanings only contain stimuli that are 
relevant to the sentence concerned. 
 
By definition, any two stimulus-meaningless sentences are stimulus-synonymous; 
their stimulus meanings are identical because they are empty. But the stimulus-
meaningless sentences need not be meaningless in the intuitive sense; and, what's 
worse, they may, intuitively speaking, differ in meaning. Thus the notion of stimulus 
synonymy seems to fail when applied to stimulus-meaningless sentences. 
 
Let us be more concrete. Which sentences are stimulus-meaningless? An important 
group of stimulus-meaningless sentences consists of the sentences which are, 
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traditionally, called analytic. There is no single stimulus prompting a speaker to 
assent to, say, 
 
2 + 2 = 4, 
 
or 
 
No bachelor is married, 
 
because the speaker would assent in any case. Thus, the two sentences are stimulus-
meaningless, and hence, stimulus-synonymous even though nobody – not even a 
philosopher – is willing to state that they mean the same, intuitively speaking. Not 
even a philosopher? Quine is willing, and among others, I am willing, too. This cries 
for elucidation. My point is that our well informed intuitions about semantics should 
be pleased with a synonymy definition implying that all (intuitively speaking) 
analytic sentences mean the same. To be sure, Quine accuses both intuitive notions, 
analyticity and synonymy, of being untenable. But he admits that if one of them were 
explicable without circularity, the other notion could be defined immediately because 
both are interdefinable: 
 
The interdefinitions run thus: sentences are synonymous if and only if their 
biconditional (formed by joining them with 'if and only if') is analytic, and a 
sentence is analytic if and only if synonymous with self-conditionals ('If p then 
p'). (WO, p. 65) 
 
If Quine is right in describing our intuitions this way, it follows that all analytic 
sentences are synonymous because (i) each of them is synonymous with 'If p then p' 
and (ii) synonymy is a transitive relation. 
 
But isn't it a little bit odd to maintain that '2 + 2 = 4' and 'No bachelor is married' 
mean the same? It is not, for they resemble each other in a crucial point: they say 
nothing at all about the state of the world. Quine wouldn't allow to put it this way, of 
course, but we are talking about semantic intuitions right now, looking for definitions 
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that fit together with these intuitions. (And it is not yet clear that we cannot find 
satisfactory definitions). 
 
I think, in regard to our intuitions, Quine wouldn't disagree. Nay, he hastens to our 
aid against the suspicion raised by the question whether '2 + 2 = 4' and 'No bachelor 
is married' both mean the same. The answer: they are synonymous in a broad sense of 
synonymy, but not so in its narrow sense: 
 
For some purposes a narrower sort of synonymy of sentences is wanted, such as 
what Carnap calls intensional isomorphism, involving certain part-by-part 
correspondences of the sentences concerned. [...] But such variant versions can 
be defined on the basis of the broader one. Synonymy of parts is defined by 
appeal to analogy of roles in synonymous wholes; then synonymy in the 
narrower sense is defined for the wholes by appeal to synonymy of homologous 
parts. So let us concentrate on the broader and more basic notion of sentence 
synonymy. (WO, p. 62) 
 
It would be complicated to spell out Carnap's notion of intensional isomorphism in 
greater detail; but this is not necessary here. I agree with Quine that the broad notion 
of synonymy is more basic. So let us concentrate on this notion of sentence 
synonymy and hence keep in mind that all analytic sentences have to be 
synonymous.8 This consequence doesn't oppose an envisaged definition of 
synonymy. On the contrary, it is exactly what we wish. 
 
Now let's go back to our discussion of stimulus synonymy. Looking for 
counterexamples, we have brought the analytic sentences into play because every 
stimulus is irrelevant to them (that means that they all are stimulus-synonymous). In 
the light of Quine's own remarks, however, we have seen a minute ago that all 
analytic sentences have to be synonymous (in the broad sense of synonymy, which is 
under discussion here). Hence, the analytic sentences cannot serve as 
counterexamples against the definition; they even support the notion of stimulus 
synonymy. Why, however, is stimulus synonymy nothing but an ersatz? In order to 
understand that it is still an ersatz we have to look for non-analytic sentences that turn 
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out to be stimulus-synonymous without corresponding in meaning, intuitively 
speaking. 
 
Sentences with lots of irrelevant stimuli are the best candidates, because their 
(affirmative and negative) stimulus meaning is so emaciated that they are too weak to 
support interesting tests of stimulus synonymy (WO, p. 63). But when should we call 
a sentence's stimulus meaning sufficiently emaciated? It is not emaciated enough as 
long as it contains at least some stimuli (WO, p. 63). Let me demonstrate this by 
means of our old example. Uttered at tea time, the sentence 'The morning paper has 
come' has lots of irrelevant stimuli. But visual L.A. Times stimuli are covered by the 
sentence's affirmative stimulus meaning. This is enough in order to distinguish the 
sentence from, say, 'The crocuses are out' (WO, p. 36), a sentence with lots of 
irrelevant stimuli, too (because it can be assented in the absence of any crocus 
stimulus). But its affirmative stimulus meaning is not totally vacant since well 
arranged crocus stimuli do prompt the speaker's assent. Now, not all crocus stimuli 
enclose L.A. Times stimuli at one and the same time. Therefore, the affirmative 
stimulus meaning of both sentences differ from each other – which means that they 
are not stimulus-synonymous. Again a reasonable result of our definition. 
 
 
III. 
To recapitulate, stimulus synonymy works well in the case (i) of sentences without 
irrelevant stimuli (e.g. 'Lo! A rabbit'), (ii) of sentences with some irrelevant and some 
relevant stimuli (e.g. 'The morning paper has come'), and (iii) in the case of analytic 
sentences to which all stimuli are irrelevant. But where are Quine's striking 
counterexamples? To answer this question, Quine's holism enters the stage. The 
Quine/Duhem-thesis of holism was meant to repudiate the second dogma of 
empiricism (i.e., the reductionist thesis that each significant scientific sentence can be 
tested in isolation). Quine calls the second dogma 'intimately connected' with the first 
one: 'The two dogmas are, indeed, at root identical' (1961, p. 41). Therefore, if the 
second dogma is wrong (that is, if holism is true), the first dogma must be wrong, too. 
This guilt by association is Quine's main charge against synonymy (and analyticity), 
and it is exactly this association which I want to dispute. On what grounds does 
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Quine extend his charges against the second dogma to also include the first dogma? 
In WO he says: 
 
The significant trait of other sentences is that experience is relevant to them 
largely in indirect ways, through the mediation of associated sentences. 
Alternatives emerge: experiences call for changing a theory, but do not indicate 
just where and how. Any of various systematic changes can accommodate the 
recalcitrant datum, and all the sentences affected by any of those possible 
alternative readjustments would evidently have to count as disconfirmed by that 
datum indiscriminately or not at all. Yet the sentences can be quite unlike with 
respect to content, intuitively speaking, or role in the containing theory (WO, p. 
64). 
 
Quine talks in terms of confirmatory and disconfirmatory experiences here. In our 
and Quine's own manner of speech, scientific 'experiences' are stimuli in the lab, 
caused by measuring instruments, pointer deflections and so on. Now let us assume 
we discover recalcitrant lab stimuli against, for example, the ether drift theory. 
Obviously, the stimuli belong to the negative stimulus meaning of ('are 
disconfirmatory experiences for') some sentence. Of which sentence, however? An 
intuitive answer would be: Simply they belong to the negative stimulus meaning of 
the sentence 'There is ether drift'. According to Quine's holism, however, this answer 
is wrong because our recalcitrant lab stimuli don't say anything about 'There is ether 
drift' in isolation. An ether drift fan, for example, wouldn't abandon his trust in ether 
drift because of one experiment only. Rather he would protest against the 
arrangement of the instruments; he would be induced to deny sentences that connect 
ether drift with those special measuring instruments. 
 
Quine's conclusion seems to be that the recalcitrant stimuli belong to the negative 
stimulus meaning, either of no sentence at all, or of every single sentence which has 
something to do with ether drift and thereby could be doubted in the light of the 
experiment. (In both alternatives, all these sentences would have the same negative 
stimulus meaning and therefore turn out to be stimulus-synonymous). 
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But Quine has overlooked a third alternative, which will eventually lead him into the 
fallacy I have announced. The alternative Quine fails to consider is as follows: The 
recalcitrant stimuli don't count as disconfirming any single sentence in isolation but 
do count as disconfirming their conjunction (which represents the complete theory). It 
is this third view I would like to plead for. We can verify it even when we consider 
two sentences only (thus simplifying ether drift physics irresponsibly, of course). The 
sentences in question are: 
 
(S) There is ether drift. 
(T) If and only if there is no ether drift, our such-and-such arranged 
interferometer has to flash as soon as turned on. 
 
Now, how would we classify flashing interferometer stimuli? They are irrelevant for 
both S and T in isolation because they don't indicate which one sentence has to be 
removed. But, definitely, flashing interferometer stimuli oppose both sentences in 
combination: 
 
(S & T) There is ether drift; and if and only if there is no ether drift, our such-
and-such arranged interferometer has to flash as soon as turned on. 
 
Flashing stimuli are not irrelevant for S & T. They belong to the negative stimulus 
meaning of the conjunction.9 
 
Can we make capital out of this fact? Let's face the losses first. Quine is right that the 
old definition of stimulus synonymy doesn't work. Now we have found the 
counterexamples we were looking for. Theoretical sentences like 'There is ether drift' 
and 'There are electrons' cannot be proved or disproved by lab stimuli in isolation. 
Their stimulus meaning is not emaciated; it is empty. Therefore, they are stimulus-
synonymous. So the notion of stimulus synonymy doesn't capture our intuitions about 
synonymy. 
 
Fortunately, our considerations open the way for a more sophisticated definition of 
synonymy. To get at this definition, we must ask more than whether two sentences 
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are stimulus-synonymous in isolation; we must ask whether they are stimulus-
synonymous in every possible theoretical context: 
 
(D1) Two sentences R and S are synonymous when and only when, for every 
sentence T (which might be a very complicated theoretical sentence), 
the logical conjunction of R and T is stimulus-synonymous to that of S 
and T.10 
 
Quine dismisses this fine definition saying no more than: 'this is yet more readily seen 
not to provide a tighter relation [than stimulus synonymy]' (WO, p. 65). This is a 
fallacy, as he could see if he were aware of the third alternative we developed above 
in order to handle recalcitrant stimuli. Though the sentences 'There is ether drift' and 
'There are electrons' are stimulus-synonymous in isolation, they are not if embedded 
in an appropriate theoretical context. Flashing interferometer stimuli are members of 
the negative stimulus meaning of 
 
(S & T) There is ether drift; and if and only if there is no ether drift, our such-
and-such arranged interferometer has to flash as soon as turned on.  
 
But they are irrelevant to this conjunction: 
 
(R & T) There are electrons; and if and only if there is no ether drift, our such-
and-such arranged interferometer has to flash as soon as turned on.  
 
Hence both conjunctions differ in stimulus meaning; thus, they are not stimulus-
synonymous. So we can deduce from our sophisticated definition D1 that the two 
existence statements R and S are not synonymous. Which shows, contrary to Quine, 
that synonymy as defined by D1 is a tighter relation than stimulus synonymy. 
 
 
IV. 
It is surprising that, though it was mentioned in Quine's own book, no one has until 
now cast this life-belt in order to save synonymy.11 Why has it been ignored so 
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completely? I am unable to speculate on the causes that may have confused Quine 
and many of his readers, but I can report the reasons for my own former confusion. 
When I first read Quine some years ago, I tested the definition D1 by using two 
analytic sentences (with different content, intuitively speaking). They turned out to be 
synonymous because whatever I'd chosen as a would-be embedding theory T, the 
conjunction formed by T and one of the analytic sentences had the same stimulus 
meaning as T alone. For instance, the two conjunctions 
 
2 + 2 = 4 and it is raining, 
 
and 
 
All bachelors are unmarried and it is raining, 
 
don't say more than their common metereological subclause alone. So both 
conjunctions are stimulus-synonymous. And of course, the same would happen if we 
chose any non-metereological conjunct whatever as an embedding 'theory'. 
According to D1, therefore, the sentences 
 
2 + 2 = 4, 
 
and  
 
All bachelors are unmarried, 
 
are synonymous. So in this case, Quine is right that our definition of synonymy fails 
to provide a tighter relation than the primitive notion of stimulus synonymy. 
 
But this result doesn't defeat our new definition at all. As we've seen in section II, it is 
again exactly what we want since we are interested in the broad sense of synonymy 
here. In this broad sense, all analytic sentences have to be synonymous with each 
other. Therefore, we can use one of them – say, a self-conditional – in order to grasp 
them all: 
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(D2) A sentence is analytic if and only if synonymous with self-conditionals 
('If p then p').  
 
As we remember, this is the second interdefinition that was mentioned by Quine in 
order to illustrate the interrelations between synonymy and analyticity. Quine couldn't 
make use of it because he failed to see an independent way of defining an interesting 
notion of synonymy. Since we, on the contrary, have supplied the missing definition 
(as given by D1), we have also got the key for the distinction between analytic and 
synthetic sentences. 
 
You may ask: Does D2 get us really the notion of analyticity for which we were so 
avidly searching? Obviously the answer must be positive, if one grants both, (i) that 
we have succeeded in defining synonymy, and (ii) that all and only the analytic 
sentences are synonymous to a logical truth like 'If p then p'. So at least Quine should 
be pleased with D2, since he himself has been proposing the latter and should have 
been convinced of the former by our reasoning in the preceding section12: There it 
has been established that holism need not block us from defining synonymy. Given 
the definability of analyticity in terms of synonymy, we may conclude that holism is 
also compatible with a notion of analyticity. 
 
If you still want to doubt the synthetic/analytic dichotomy, however, you may simply 
question that we can define analyticity in terms of synonymy as done in D2. – What 
semantic intuitions can we appeal to in order to make it plausible that indeed all and 
only the analytic sentences are synonymous to 'If p then p'? It wouldn't be enough 
merely to rely on the conspicuous fact that even so strong a critic of semantic 
intuitions as Quine does not dispute the conceptual connection between synonymy 
and analyticity. Here is the very general reason why I believe that Quine is right: 
synonymous sentences bear the same factual content; analytic sentences have zero 
factual content; so analytic sentences have to be synonymous with each other, which 
means that they must be synonymous to any obvious case of analyticity, e.g., to a 
self-conditional. 
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Instead of arguing for these semantic intuitions, however, I want to investigate more 
concretely whether our notion of analyticity as defined in D2 is extensionally 
equivalent to the intuitive notion of analyticity which we were out to explicate. Now 
an explicans need of course not match the explicandum perfectly: a matching in the 
essential cases will suffice. Quine's behavioristic imitation of analyticity, viz., 
stimulus analyticity, fails to provide a matching even in some essential cases. In these 
cases, I shall argue, our new notion of analyticity does better than Quine's stimulus 
analyticity. 
 
Quine defines a sentence to be stimulus-analytic if and only if the speaker is disposed 
to assent to the sentence come what may, i.e., if the speaker is disposed to assent 
under any stimulation whatever. Should we set aside one complication (see footnote 
below), this notion is also characterizable in terms of stimulus synonymy, as follows: 
 
(D3) A sentence is stimulus-analytic if and only if it is stimulus-synonymous 
to 'If p then p'.13  
 
Quine's argument against stimulus analyticity consists in the claim that it is too loose 
a notion to approximate analyticity in the intuitive sense. This claim parallels his 
claim against stimulus synonymy, and D3 shows us why the parallel isn't merely a 
coincidence: If stimulus synonymy needs tightening in order to approximate 
synonymy in the intuitive sense, then the same must be true of stimulus analyticity. 
Now D1 provides a narrower notion of synonymy than stimulus synonymy (cf. 
section III). If, therefore, we turn D3 into D2 by replacing stimulus synonymy with 
synonymy in our sense, we may expect to arrive at a narrower notion of analyticity as 
well.14 Before I demonstrate, by means of two examples, that this expectation isn't 
illusory (section V), I want to propose an alternative characterization of analyticity 
which makes it easier to deal with examples and avoids an awkward drawback of D2. 
 
The drawback I have in mind is our appeal in D2 to self-conditionals as obvious cases 
of analyticity. Wouldn't it be nicer to circumscribe the analytic sentences without 
presupposing that self-conditionals are analytic? Let us try. Combining our two 
definitions, D1 and D2, we obtain: 
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(D4) A sentence S is analytic if and only if for all T, the conjunction of S and 
T is stimulus-synonymous to that of a self-conditional and T.  
 
Our present aim is to get rid of the self-conditional in D4 where it is conjoined to the 
sentence T. Now does it change a sentence's stimulus meaning if we combine it, by 
conjunction, with a self-conditional? Not at all – each sentence is, I claim, stimulus-
synonymous to its conjunction with 'If p then p'.15 If this is granted16, our 
characterization of analyticity runs thus: 
 
(D5) A sentence S is analytic if and only if for all T, the conjunction of S and 
T is stimulus-synonymous to T.17  
 
Such is the promised definition, cleansed of any assumption about self-conditionals. 
 
 
V. 
For the remaining part of the paper I wish to demonstrate how D5 can be viewed as 
giving substance to the intuitive assumption that analytic sentences don't carry any 
factual (or, if you want, empirical) content. In a weak sense, this is already true of 
stimulus-analytic sentences, since they are assented to come what may. This way of 
lacking factual content, however, isn't strong enough (as will be seen in two 
examples). By contrast, D5 provides a stronger version of this trait of analyticity: An 
analytic sentence is empty not only in isolation, but also when embedded in any 
possible context. That is to say, an analytic sentence never alters the factual content 
of a sentence to which it is conjoined. Let us examine this difference between 
analytic and stimulus-analytic sentences in the light of the aforementioned examples. 
 
The first example is a bit confusing – at least to me. But because it is the only 
example Quine has to offer in WO against stimulus analyticity, it is worthwhile to 
scrutinize it. Here is the example: 
 
(D) There have been black dogs (WO, p. 66).  
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Obviously, D won't qualify for analyticity in any intuitive sense. Is it stimulus-
analytic? Quine thinks so, because he holds that each speaker is disposed to assent to 
D come what may. Whether this is so, I am not sure.18 But I am quite sure that D fails 
to be analytic in the sense of D5. 
 
To see this, we need to find a sentence C that isn't stimulus-synonymous to the 
conjunction of C and D. The following sentence will do: 
 
(C) The class of animals, which appear to humans under normal conditions 
to be black, contains no black animals, but only pink ones. This optical 
illusion results from their constantly producing a gas which absorbs all 
visible light. This gas is difficult to detect, because it dissolves close to 
the surface of pink animals. Furthermore, animals which seem to 
humans not to be black are, indeed, not black.  
 
C implies, I think, that there haven't been any black dogs. So, embedding the dog 
sentence D in the context C yields a conjunction which will elicit each speaker's 
dissent under whatever stimulation. Therefore, there exists no stimulation that is 
relevant to the conjunction C & D; its stimulus meaning is empty. 
 
But the stimulus meaning of C alone isn't empty. Because C is a very strong general 
statement, it is easy to name 'experiences' (stimuli) which would suffice to disprove 
C. Consider a sophisticated vacuum cleaner, which removes all gas particles from the 
surface of any given object. Let's suppose the linguist applies this Super Hoover to a 
dog which seems black to the native. If the procedure doesn't change the dog's colour, 
C must be rejected. And it must be rejected on the ground of the very stimulation the 
linguist has presented to the speaker. This stimulation is relevant to C, because unlike 
C & D, C alone need not be rejected come what may. If indeed the dog's colour turns 
pink, the corresponding stimulation does not prompt the speaker's dissenting from C. 
(The speaker may then withhold his judgement concerning C; and even if he still 
dissents from it, it is not because of the stimulation in question). Having found a 
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stimulus which is relevant to C alone, we must conclude that C isn't stimulus-
synonymous to C & D, q.e.d. 
 
So much about Quine's only example against stimulus analyticity. Admittedly the 
example does not reflect much of the substance in Quine's opposition towards the 
analytic. We need a more serious example. 
 
Quine rejects the notion of analyticity because of holism: There are, he claims, 
sentences so remote from possible experience that, whatever recalcitrant datum we 
may face, we may still maintain our assent to those sentences – if only we readjust 
the rest of our theory. Such sentences are, then, stimulus-analytic (they are assented 
to come what may), but they need not be analytic in the intuitive sense.19 I want to 
show that they also fail to be analytic in the sense of D5. 
 
The best example for Quine's case I can imagine stems from the early days of 
quantum physics. It is Einstein's famous standing sentence: 
 
(G) God does not play dice,  
 
which was Einstein's metaphoric way of expressing his firm trust in determinism. (He 
didn't like the aleatoric elements in quantum physics). Simplifying Einstein's verbal 
dispositions, we want to assume that he was disposed to assent to G come what may; 
in his idiolect, the sentence was stimulus-analytic. Now G is not analytic in the 
intuitive sense. Let me show that D5 yields the same result. 
 
Einstein's assent to G was incompatible with the quantum theory Q of his opponents. 
Therefore, Einstein and his opponents didn't need to experiment in order to disprove 
the conjunction of G (or an appropriate paraphrase of it in more scientific jargon) 
with Q; they all had to dissent from G & Q under whatever experimental stimulation. 
Thus, the conjunction's stimulus meaning is empty. But the stimulus meaning of Q 
alone is not empty. Q is a respectable scientific theory, open to an empirical 
investigation. There are possible stimulations which would disprove Q empirically. 
And those stimulations are, then, relevant to Q, even in Einstein's idiolect. (Einstein 
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would have welcomed them, happy, indeed, to dissent from Q because of an 
experiment). Even for Einstein, we conclude, Q alone is not stimulus-synonymous to 
the conjunction of G and Q. Ergo, G isn't analytic in the sense of D5, q.e.d. 
 
I conclude from the discussion of the two examples that the notion of analyticity I 
have been proposing works well in cases where Quine's stimulus analyticity fails. My 
second example, it seems to me, may be viewed representative for the way D5 
relieves the analytic from Quine's holistic shock. There may be arguments against the 
synthetic/analytic distinction which are not grounded in holism. What I wished to 
show is that we can accept the Quine/Duhem thesis without forgoing the notion of 
analyticity. The two 'dogmas' of empiricism are not in the same boat.20 
 
 
 
 
NOTES 
 
 
 
 
*
 I am grateful to Wolfgang Carl, Kit Fine, Gerhard Hauser, Christine Holten, 
David Hyder, Lorenz Krüger, Sven Rosenkranz, Layli Shirani, and two 
anonymous referees for helpful comments on earlier versions of this paper. 
 
1 Quine's comrades were Goodman (1952), Mates (1952), and White (1952).  
 
2 Quine (1961). 
 
3 Quine (1960). 
 
4 Harman mentions such an argument in order to convince Quine that he'd better 
cleanse the entire chapter II from behavioristic formulations (1969, pp. 22/3). 
Quine's reply is loaded with clear reservations: 'I am not sure [...] whether I want 
to be cleared [of the suspicion of philosophical behaviorism]' (1969, p. 296). 
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5 For sake of simplicity, I shall pursuit our discussion exclusively in terms of 
Quine's stimulus semantics as presented in WO, thereby neglecting important 
changes Quine's system has undergone in later publications. These changes are 
not important for our discussion; my arguments can be rephrased so as to fit into 
Quine's more recent framework. It is not necessary to take the effort of 
repudiating Quine's reservations towards synonymy and analyticicty in more 
recent terms because the essence of Quine's reservations remains unchanged. 
They are already most forcefully argued for in WO and in Quine (1961). 
Compare, however, footnotes 9, 12, 17 below. 
 
6 Quine separates the two questions as well: 'The distinction [between the analytic 
and the synthetic – O.M.] itself, and not merely an epistemological question 
concerning it, is what is then in question' (1976, p.130). Here is more textual 
evidence for an interpretation according to which Quine, among other things, 
really wished to deny that analyticicty is an intelligible notion: 
 
 'Now here the difficulty is simply [...] the word 'analytic', which we do not 
understand!' (1961, p. 33).  
 '[...] a boundary between analytic and synthetic statements simply has not 
been drawn. That there is such a distinction to be drawn at all is an 
unempirical dogma of empiricists, a metaphysical article of faith' (1961, p. 
37).  
 'But I hope we are now impressed with how stubbornly the distinction 
between analytic and synthetic has resisted any straightforward drawing' 
(1961, p. 41). 
 
7 Stimuli prompting assent have to contribute causally to the informant's reaction 
(WO, p. 30). In order to verify causal claims of this sort, unlike Quine I want to 
allow more than mere black box tests. In this respect, Quine's behaviorism is 
antiquated. Why not hope for powerful methods of neurophysiology? 
 
8 Admittedly, Quine doesn't explicitly say that the analytic sentences are 
synonymous in the broad sense; he only implies that they are: Continuing his 
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discussion of broad synonymy, three pages later he arrives at the interdefinitions 
quoted above. And as we've already seen, from these interdefinitions it follows 
that analytic sentences are synonymous (in the sense of synonymy under 
discussion, i.e., in the broad sense of synonymy). 
 
9 In many publications other than WO, it is Quine himself who maintains that 
sentences not testable in isolation can indeed be tested when joined into a 
sufficiently large conjunction. To quote a more recent Quinean metaphor, we 
have to put sentences together until 'critical semantical mass' is reached (1992, p. 
17). That 'critical semantical mass' can be reached is the positive side of the 
holistic doctrine. It is Quine's failure in chapter II of WO not to be aware of this 
positive side at a very crucial point in his argumentation. There he seems only to 
see the negative side of holism, which consists of the claim that most sentences 
don't have critical semantical mass in isolation. In publications later than WO, on 
the other hand, Quine clearly saw the positive side of his holism; there he failed 
to realize how it can be invoked for defining analyticity, see footnote 12. 
 
10 For Quine's formulation, see WO, p. 65. As noted by Quine, the roots of this idea 
can be traced to Grice / Strawson (1989). But Grice and Strawson stated only that 
such a definition was possible, without intending to defend it, see p. 210. 
 
 Admittedly, D1 can be applied to a foreign object language only if we manage to 
spot its logical conjunction. But Quine himself generously allows us to assume 
the translatability of the logical constants (cf. WO, §13). 
 
11 As far as I can see, Gilbert Harman (1969) is the only commentator on chapter II 
who mentions the fallacy. According to Harman, Quine allows 'his argument to 
appear weaker than it is' (1969, p. 24 – my italics). Harman seems to view the 
fallacy as an unhappy accident. But Harman considers the Quinean argument as 
an argument against the determinacy of translation, not as an argument against 
the possibility of defining (intralinguistic) synonymy. Obviously this cannot be 
so, because the proposal 'too quickly' dismissed by Quine cannot be understood 
to work interlinguistically at all. This has been seen by Quine, see WO, p. 65. 
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12 There are indications in Quine's more recent publications that he is not opposed 
to an intralinguistic notion of synonymy in the fashion of D2 anymore: 
 
 'One is tempted to suppose that we might define meanings for sentences of 
less than critical mass, and even for terms, by substitutivity. If we can 
interchange two expressions without disturbing the empirical content of any 
testable context, are they not alike in meaning?' (1992, p. 53).  
 
 But he isn't interested much in that (intralinguistic) notion, as he continues: 
 
 'Well, the plan collapses between languages. Interchanging expressions 
would turn the context into nonsense if the expressions belong to different 
languages. So the plan offers no relief from the indeterminacy of translation' 
(1992, p. 53).  
 
 Even if we grant Quine that we cannot reach at an acceptable interlinguistic 
notion of synonymy, we need not despair of analyticity, because analyticity is 
already definable in terms of intralinguistic synonymy. But Quine is aware of 
this as well. Most recently, he has pointed to the other side of this very same 
coin, stating that intralinguistic but not interlinguistic synonymy is definable in 
terms of analyticity (1991, p. 271). 
 
 To put the scattered pieces of Quine's more recent views together: (i) 
intralinguistic (but not interlinguistic) synonymy is definable; (ii) analyticity is 
definable in terms of intralinguistic synonymy. It would seem that Quine has to 
conclude that (iii) there is a reasonable criterion for analyticity, too. But 
persistently Quine refuses to accept this (1991, p. 271). 
 
13 To tell the truth, this formulation yields wildly paradoxical results, since it 
renders, say, contradictions stimulus-analytic. (This is because each contradiction 
has as empty a stimulus meaning as has a self-conditional. For no stimulation 
whatsoever can suffice to prompt the native's reaction to a contradiction. So all 
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stimuli are irrelevant to a contradiction as well as to a self-conditional.) But it is 
easy to fix this defect of D3: 
 
(D3') A sentence is stimulus-analytic if and only if it is synonymous to 'If p 
then p', and if the speaker is disposed to assent to the sentence.  
 
 For clarity, I am going to omit the italized extra clause in the text. Don't worry 
about that; it won't harm my main argument, as I spell out in the next footnote. 
 
14 Since D3 does not really define stimulus analyticity, but a still weaker notion (cf. 
previous footnote), it may seem that in fact D2 is not stronger than the correct 
version of D3, that is, D3'. Let us see what happens to the argument from the text 
when we apply it to D3'. Replacing stimulus synonymy with synonymy in our 
sense we obtain from D3': 
 
(D2') A sentence is analytic if and only if synonymous with self-conditionals 
('If p then p') and if the speaker is disposed to assent to the sentence.  
 
 But here we can omit the italized extra clause because a speaker must assent to a 
sentence which is analytic in the sense of D2. (For the proof, see footnote 17). 
 
15 This is much less of an empirical claim than may seem. It is better understood as 
a methodological restriction on the translation of the native's logical constants, a 
restriction which has been called 'principle of charity': Evidence that speaks 
against the stimulus-synonymy of a given sentence and a conjunction of the latter 
with a self-conditional is better regarded as calling our translation of the native's 
logical arsenal into question.  
 
16 If the stimulus synonymy of the two sentences were not granted, we could still 
use D5 for establishing the synthetic/analytic distinction. The only thing I would 
have to withdraw in this case is my claim that D2 und D5 are equivalent. Faced, 
then, with the alternative of choosing between D2 and D5, I would of course opt 
for D5, because it presupposes less than D2. But let us assume for the rest of our 
  
 
23 
 
discussion that the stimulus synonymy of T and 'T, and if p then p' is granted (so 
that D2 and D5 are equivalent). 
 
 Let us assume even more. Let us assume that the native's logical constants have 
been translated in such a way that makes each pair of logically equivalent 
sentences stimulus-synonymous (principle of charity). From this we can conclude 
that each truth of logic is also analytic in the sense of D2 and D5. But in order to 
obtain this nice result, we had of course to appeal to a notion of logical 
equivalence, or alternatively (what boils down to the same), to a notion of logical 
truth. According to Quine, fortunately, this notion is unproblematic (1961, pp. 
22/23 and 1976, pp. 109/110). 
 
 You may ask: Are there more examples for analyticity, outside logic? The answer 
is positive, but it is beyond the reach of this paper to establish further examples. 
In Mueller (1998) I show that mathematical statements are analytic in the sense 
defined (see §10.16); I also argue for the analyticity of certain Carnap sentences 
(see §§11.6-11.13). So my notion of analyticity is much stronger than the notion 
for everyday life purposes which Quine is prepared to grant us in his more 
generous moments, cf. Quine (1974, pp. 78-80) and (1991, pp. 270/1). 
 
17 Is D5 outdated in the light of Quine's more recent publicatons? As an anonymous 
referee has pointed out to me, one might think so: Quine does not believe any 
longer that the linguist can compare stimulations occuring at the surfaces of 
different speakers (1992, p. 42). As a consequence, the notion of stimulus 
synonymy cannot be applied to sentences from different speakers. The notion 
thus looses much of its interest; e.g. it won't be essential for the project of radical 
translation. However uninteresting the notion may be for some philosophical 
purposes, it is still well defined for the intrapersonal case, which is enough for 
our definition D5: the definition merely appeals to stimulus-synonymous 
sentences from one and the same speaker's idiolect. – A similar remark applies to 
the parallel objection against D1. 
 
 Given D5, it is easy to prove what I had promised in footnote 14: 
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(*) Each analytic sentence S is stimulus-analytic.  
 
 Proof: Let s be any stimulation. We have to show that a speaker has to assent to S 
under the stimulation s. There exists a sentence T(s) to which the speaker is 
prompted to assent by s. (Take for T(s) e.g. a partial description of what the 
speaker sees or hears or smells). According to D5, s must be contained in the 
affirmative stimulus meaning of S & T(s). But the speaker's assent to this 
conjunction is only possible if he is also disposed to assent to the first conjunct S 
alone, q.e.d. – The converse of (*) doesn't hold as will be seen in section V. 
 
18 For I can imagine a speaker who had never seen any black dog. Such a speaker 
may withhold his judgement of D up to his first black dog stimulation, which, in 
fact and at this time, prompts him to assent to D. So at least D seems not to be 
stimulus-analytic for everybody. 
 
19 Quine (1961, pp. 41, 43) and (1981, pp. 71/72). 
 
20 I shall give a more detailed defense of synonymy and analyticity against Quine's 
meaning skepticism in Mueller (1998). 
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